How Clausewitzian is Bismarck's diplomacy:an introduction

Otto von Bismarck is born in 1815 in Mark Branderburg, Prussia. Bismarck has acquired a degree in law from the University of Göttingen to become a civil servant. From 1847 onwards Bismarck has been a member of the Prussian Diet and Erfurt Parliament, served as a Prussian ambassador to the Germanic Diet, to Russia and to France (Olson and Shadle, 1991, p.57). From 1862 onwards, Bismarck works as a Minister-President and wages the three wars which unify Germany, and becomes the first Chancellor of Germany. Bismarck’s stunning political success with German plan is admired by many political figures. For instance, Kissinger (March 31, 2011) calls Bismarck a “master statesman”. Scholars recognise Bismarck’s political genius and analyse it in their works. For example, Pflanze (1958, pp.492-493) notes that Bismarck is a statesman with an extraordinary sense judgement and an ability to pursue their goal in the power politics of the 19^th century.

By Uni Dusseldorf: Bismarck with Pickelhaube

Bismarck is a popular subject in the academic research of the post-First World War period. Bismarck's contribution to the process of German unification has been studied by historians and publicists. However, scholars have not sufficiently explained Bismarck’s approach to diplomacy. Notably, the issue which remains largely unaddressed is the set of principles which Bismarck’s policy adheres to (Holborn, 1960, p.95). This omission is crucial to understanding Bismarck, because their political decisions have been noted to follow some rules which Bismarck has been devoted to (ibid.). There are some scholars, such as Holborn (1960) and Pflanze (1958), who attempt to sketch them, using the Bismarck’s early correspondence and memoirs. However, the shallow theoretical base, which the contemporary researchers call Realpolitik, fails to explain Bismarck’s framework of policy-making. Moreover, these studies fall short of explaining how Bismarck has dealt with international politics, and managed to unify Germany in three consecutive wars, which remains to be a riddle yet to resolve for many historians (Kissinger, March 31, 2011).                                                                                  

In order to avoid any confusion in respect of the substance of Realpolitik, a brief explanation is presented here. Bismarck’s version of the Realpolitik tradition belongs to the realist school, which includes contributions of Machiavelli (Dietz, 1986), Waltz (Wayman and Diehl, 1994) and others. Nevertheless, Bismarck’s understanding of Realpolitik is scarcely reflected in Bismarck’s documents and letters. Consequently, Realpolitik is watered down to just several ideas, which can be identified in Bismarck’s style of diplomacy.

The origins of the mentioned approach lie in the work of Rochau (1853), called Grundsätze der Realpolitik. Nonetheless, Rochau’s formulation of Realpolitik is significantly different from Bismarck’s, and is mostly forgotten. For instance, Holborn (1960, pp.94-95) notes the change in the meaning after the 1948. Realpolitik is identified as a form of politics, devoid of ideological and moral principles (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.), and focusing on the pursuit of state interests, using the break-down of the power structures (McLean and McMillan, 2009).

However, Bismarck’s Realpolitik does not contain an extensive set of principles because Bismarck soon acquires the prime-ministerial position and abandons the theory. Nonetheless, scholars use another approach to learn more about Bismarck’s theoretical background. For instance, Stoler (2005, p.7) points out that Bismarck is the most successful practitioner of “the war as a continuation of policy” approach, developed by a Prussian scholar Clausewitz. However, there is no extensive research to support this claim. This is so, because the practical application of Clausewitz’s theory is exceedingly understudied (Stoler, 2005, p.8), which in turn is due to the scarcity of cases of politicians who practice it (Esposito, 1954). Thus, the test of Clausewitz’s political theory on Bismarck’s policy-making may enrich the research on both Bismarck and Clausewitz, and help to develop the policy-making, international relations and strategy.

By Wilhelm Camphausen. Napoleon III and Bismarck talk after the Napoleon's capture at the battle of Sedan

The reason why Bismarck is noted to be a Clausewitzian is because they share a similar view of the war and the policy-making. Clausewitz holds a high regard for one’s ability to control the machinery of war and argues that a great policy-maker has to be able to exercise restraint, and conduct a war only for the sake of securing a political objective. To note, is it even possible to remain so focused on the objective, and remain unaffected by the chaos and violence of war? Spence (2013, p.149) argues that it is very difficult to concentrate on achieving political goal from the moment of the war’s outbreak. However, Clausewitz points out that a reason and impassionate judgement can turn a war into a policy instrument.

The kind of control and the rationalist stance, which Clausewitz praises and Spence (2013) finds extremely difficult to achieve, is frequently attributed to Bismarck, who manages to reorganise Europe and unify Germany in just over a decade (Kissinger, March 31, 2011). Bismarck is an example of a statesman who delivers a political objectives and uses a war as the means. Therefore, this work serves to fill the gap on Bismarck’s diplomacy by testing Clausewitz’s theory of policy-making against Bismarck’s conduct of foreign policy. This study relies on the discursive method to produce an in-depth analysis of the topic, densely covered by historical material and various accounts (King et al., 1994, p.4).

This approach allows to develop an impression of Bismarck’s set of principles and see whether Bismarck’s policy-making is based on Clausewitz’s framework to any degree (Trachtenberg, 2006, pp.26-32). Also, Clausewitz’s theory holds an advantage compared to other analytical tools in regards to Bismarck, because it maintains a high degree of relevance to the historical context of Bismarck’s policy-making (Trachtenberg, 2006, p.45). The theory used in this analysis has been developed by a Prussian who lives in the same political and historical conditions as Bismarck with only a brief time gap.

Consequently, this paper aims to investigate the proposition holding that Bismarck has conducted a policy in accordance with Clausewitz’s approach. Moreover, it seeks to do so by attempting to answer the question: how Clausewitzian is Bismarck? Such a wording allows this study to explore the extent to which Bismarck is an example of Clausewitz’s ideal policy-maker and gives the opportunity to reflect on possible deviations from the model.

Furthermore, taking into account that Clausewitz’s political theory is primarily focused on the conduct of war, this study analyses Bismarck’s policy-making during the period of wars for German unification. The wars of unification are the only wars which are completely directed by Bismarck as a statesman. In order to ensure that the sequencing of the events remains undisputed in the analysis, the wars are discussed in a chronological manner (Kompf, 2010).  

In addition, there is only one type of the text source most readily available for this research- the academic literature. Hence, this study uses a secondary literature, primarily written in English language, such as the scholarly books, articles, and translated official documents. This analysis may certainly omit some useful academic works written in other languages, which could have sufficiently enhanced one’s understanding of Clausewitz’s political theory. Nonetheless, this study finds that the English-written literature is extensive enough to be used for the research on Bismarck’s foreign policy-making.

The paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines Clausewitz’s political framework and the scholarly literature on the subject. This is done in order to explain the political concepts and Clausewitz’s political theory. The second chapter briefly analyses Bismarck’s theory of Realpolitik, broken down into several political conceptualisations and analysed based on its consistency with Clausewitz’s political theory. The third chapter discusses the extent to which Bismarck’s foreign policy during the period of German unification can be described as Clausewitzian. This chapter is deals with Bismarck’s policy during the wars against Denmark, Austria, and France.