How Clausewitzian is Bismarck's diplomacy: the literature analysis. Part II

Chapter I. Clausewitz and responses to it cont'd

By unknown artist. Book scan from Muller-Baden, Emanuel, editor, Library of common and practical information, volume 4, Berlin, Leipzig

Frazer and Hutchings (2011) suggest that Clausewitz’s theory of politics is inherently tied to violence, although they admit that violence can serve certain political ends and be limited to one occasion. Frazer and Hutchings (2011, p.57) note that Clausewitz’s books are “sometimes read” as a source regarding violence as a “central, perennial” tool in a policy-maker’s toolbox. However, this claim does not give any evidence and the authors leave all the analytical work amiss. Moreover, contemporary scholars do not interpret Clausewitz in such way and never imply that the absence of war in a toolbox makes a state deficient or weak (Howard, 1969, p.194). Even non-interpreting academics such as Esposito (1954) do not demonstrate any grounds for the claim and read Clausewitz’s words correctly. In addition, at the end of the article, Frazer and Hutchings (2011, p.60) contradict their own argument and agree with Aron (1983, pp.100-116), saying that Clausewitz’s model of state’s policy relies on the variety of means, regarding violence to be just one of the tools available.

Furthermore, Frazer and Hutchings (2011, p.58) believe that only “incapable” policy-makers would need war to compensate for their wrong actions and use violence to achieve a particular political result. They rest their claim on Clausewitz’s words, holding that war is meant to achieve the destruction of the opponent; and the conquered state should be forced to submit to the peace dictated by the victor. This view may be based on the opinion of the 18^th century strategists, such as General Lossau (Gat, 1989, p.242), thinking that states engage in war because violence can achieve something that peaceful methods cannot.

Nonetheless, Clausewitz’s view is different, it only holds that war has the power of enforcement which is a unique quality compared to that of other policy instruments; it compels the defeated state to satisfy the winner’s demands (Wagner, 2000). However, it is not clear why they deduce that in Clausewitz’s opinion politicians use war to fix their past political decisions. The authors’ view demonstrates how Clausewitz becomes misread once the reader forgets to account for the political dimension, which is “the womb in which war develops” (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.149).

Fraser and Hutchings (2011) think that Clausewitz urges policy-makers to start a war and use the overwhelming military strength to destroy the army, bend the defeated state to achieve their goals. The issue of how the political objectives become achieved by military means, which is the actual focus of Clausewitz’s work, is not addressed. In comparison, Esposito (1954) concisely explains the role of military operations and how they serve a policy. In essence, Esposito (1954, p.20) analyses the meaning and the context for the use of word “destruction” in Clausewitz’s writings.

Although Clausewitz speaks of destroying enemy’s military forces, the destruction is not necessarily physical; the state has to make the opponent unable to fight using any means suitable for policy-makers and the military (Esposito, 1954, p.20). Moreover, Howard (1983, p.44) goes on to argue that the kind of destruction that Clausewitz finds to be crucial to winning is not physical, but moral one. For instance, Clausewitz speaks of weapons and prisoners as the true trophies of victory and the evidence of one’s superiority over the enemy (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.232). Hence, the more trophies one side acquires by the end of the battle, the greater the moral damage inflicted on the enemy (Howard, 1983, pp.44-45). Another instance is that one successful battle can end the war because it defeats the opponent’s spirit to fight (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.97).

In contrast to Fraser and Hutchings’ view (2011) holding that Clausewitz’s war is meant to overwrite policy-maker’s failure, Esposito (1954) explains that war emerges out of the context of political relations, building on the web of interests constructing a balance of power system (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.373). In other words, war is treated as one of the elements of social engagement between nations (Esposito, 1954, p.20). Moreover, the character of war is determined by the character of policy; if policy objectives are grand then the war will be also, and it will go closer to its absolute form (Howard and Paret, 1976, pp.87-88).

What is unique about Esposito’s study (1954) is their perspective on Clausewitz’s model of a policy-maker. The author quotes the words of British Mayor Murphy from 1909, holding that every policy-maker should be regarded as a Clausewitz’s follower. A Clausewitzian policy-maker treats the war as an instrument of policy and a fair act of relations between nations, and a means of promoting state interests (Murphy, 1909, cited in Esposito, 1954, p.21). Nonetheless, the quote misinterprets Clausewitz’s instructions and holds that a policy-maker is likely to engage in absolute war to achieve the political ends. On the other hand, Clausewitz asserts that the more war is driven to pursue an objective the less it will become an absolute war (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.88). In addition, Esposito (1954, p.22) soften the rhetoric, admitting that Clausewitz advises politicians to think carefully about the need for any war and think more about the policy which a war should serve.

The policy-makers’ conduct of war receives significant attention from Howard (1969), who builds upon Clausewitz’s traditional discussion of war as a continuation of policy. Howard (1969) argues that Clausewitz’s readers fail to grasp one of the crucial elements namely the self-limitation. The studies discussed so far make an impression that Clausewitz’ ideal policy-maker is calculating, yet quite willing to use violence to achieve the desired ends (Walzer, 1978, p.79). On the other hand, Howard (1969) convincingly asserts that Clausewitzian policy-maker which uses war as a policy tool must possess qualities such as self-restraint and moral awareness.

Howard (1969) draws on the political framework of limited war in order to justify it. Indeed, Howard and Paret’s translation of Clausewitz’s work (1976, p.81) demonstrates that political conditions of the limited war can take the form of self-restraint. With the condition that war is subordinated to politics, the smaller the concessions which a state demands from an opponent, the less the opponent is likely to resist the demands. Consequently, the less the adversary is inclined to object to one’s demand, the less one needs to do to compel them to obey (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.81).

Smith (2005, p.13) similarly thinks that Clausewitz values the quality of self-restraint in policy-makers. For instance, Clausewitz writes in one letter that a generous treatment of the defeated Napoleon will prevent the escalation of hostility and decrease the chances of a military resistance in the future (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is important to note that such line of reasoning reflects an instrumentalist approach, not necessarily a moral one. To add, Keegan (1993, p.385) is convinced that Clausewitz advocates self-restraint and suggests that the habit of restraint in politics can ultimately result in fewer wars.

Moreover, Howard (1969) justifies their position using Clausewitz’s writings and the analysis of historical context. The kind of restraint which the author means is a type of rationalist control to be exercised by a policy-maker. Howard’s interpretation (1969, p.196) of Clausewitz’s work implies that, not only a war is an instrument of policy, but it should be one. It rests on the view that political relations do not stop when states become engaged in a war (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.607). Thus, politics still influences the actions of conflicting states, so it would be senseless to delegate the war to the military alone (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.607). Also, the common sense urges policy-makers to be in control of the war and the military conduct, because political conditions shape the war and violence can make any war absolute (Smith, 2005, p.102). Heuser (2002, p.42) agrees with Howard (1969). Heuser (2002, p.42) scrutinises the difference between limited and absolute wars and regards the two as the complete opposites: on of self-discipline and other of brute force, the war with restraints preventing the outbreak of chaos and the war that destroys the civil society.

Nevertheless, this ground alone does not suffice to explain why Howard (1969) thinks that Clausewitz’s instrumentalist approach to war addresses the issues of morality. Therefore, Howard (1969) communicates the idea of morality in a different way. Howard (1969, p.198) draws on Clausewitz’s lessons to take from French Revolution. Howard and Paret’s translation (1976, pp.585-594) reads that French Revolution demonstrates an unprecedented case of mass-scale casualties during the war, and this fact makes Clausewitz anxious about its prospects. Clausewitz finds that the limits to the use of violence become weaker due to the growth of nationalism; the bonds which limit the scale of violence become fragile and the wars is reaching its absolute form (Howard and Paret, 1976, pp.585-594).

This argument certainly demonstrates that Clausewitz advocates greater limitations to be adopted to limit the scale of war. However, there is no agreement among the scholars as to whether in Clausewitz’s view morality can ever become a mechanism of restraint. In addition, Nielsen (2007, p.213) notes that Clausewitz has equated morality with positive law, which they find useless. This is because morality cannot override the state’s right to pursue its interests (Clausewitz, 2014, p.239).

However, in relation to the military operations, Clausewitz highlights the need for making decisions based with some respect for morality, although Howard (1969) does not mention it at all. In one passage, Clausewitz notes that the strategy planning a destruction of the opponent’s ability to fight has to address the moral issues (Howard and Paret, 1976, p.97). Hence, the state should evaluate the need for destruction of the opponent based on morality, just as it does with costs, and risks (ibid.). Clausewitz is painfully aware of the horrors of war and deliberately gives a detailed account of the disadvantages such a policy tool holds (Nielsen, 2007, p.223).