How Clausewitzian is Bismarck's diplomacy: Bismarck's policy

Chapter II. Bismarck’s Realpolitik

Andrews (1965, p.345) asserts that German historians, the most ardent scholars of Bismarck’s diplomacy, could not identify the nature of Bismarck’s approach. They do not agree on the subject of Bismarck’s aims in foreign policy, and whether Bismarck’s decisions are actually the most appropriate in particular circumstances. However, Bismarck’s letters exchange with Gerlach from the 1850s demonstrates Bismarck’s attempts to identify some principles, based on their analysis of Prussia’s foreign policy (Steinberg, 2012, pp.130-134). Although the works theorising Bismarck’s approach are very scarce, a brief comparison is possible. 

This chapter shows that Bismarck’s account of international relations is quite Clausewitzian, both in terms of the concepts and the substance of Prussia’s interests. This chapter is divided into three subsections. The first, second and third subsection focus on the main themes of Bismarck’s Realpolitik: politics/policy-making, multiple options approach, and measures for peace.

1. Policy-making

Bismarck’s model of policy-making holds that one should only pursue the objectives dictated by state’s interests (Bismarck, January 27, 1863, cited in Petersdorf et al., 1924-1935, vol. X, p.157). Hence, statesman’s conduct should always be a representation of state’s goals and preferences (Pflanze, 1958, p.495). Bismarck’s thinking coincides with Clausewitz’s because both emphasise that state’s interest should be the ultimate guide for policy-making. For Clausewitz, such a commitment ensures that in a situation of war the policy-maker strives to deliver a policy which counteracts the chaos.

Furthermore, Bismarck finds the duty of a policy-maker in determining the interests of a state depending on particular circumstances. For instance, Bismarck (2007, p.173) in 1855 contemplates about the benefits of alliance and whether such tool can serve Prussia’s interests. In their view, Prussia does not have a stance on this question, and the state will be contempt with any option at any time. From the perspective of Clausewitz, such a flexibility provides a greater advantage for using war for political ends, because Prussia can choose a form of alliance that increases the chances of victory and serves the security purpose.

This is why Bismarck has opposed the idea of a principle-based policy. For instance, when Prussian King refuses to forge an alliance agreement with France due to the history of Franco-Prussian relations, Bismarck expresses their disapproval (Taylor, 1955, pp.35-40). This is because Bismarck’s ideal foreign policy is devoid of bias. This bias commands a policy-maker to restrict their options based on their feelings of affection and enmity (Bismarck, 2 May 1857, cited in Petersdorf et al., 1924-1935,vol.XIV, pp.464-468).

Additionally, Bismarck asserts that a policy-making needs to analyse the costs, risks and available power for a purpose (Steinberg, 2012, p.472). Indeed, as Clausewitz says, a war is a testing ground for the policy-maker’s ability to act rationally, and the unjustified risks should be avoided. Hence, Bismarck’s thinking fits with the description of a Clausewitz’s ideal leader. Such policy-maker has to have a calculating mind -a rational outlook- which allows them to grasp the situation perfectly and make the most appropriate decision. Therefore, Bismarck regards war as a useful method only if “all other means are exhausted”, and an objective is “worthy of the sacrifices which every war demands” (Bismarck, n.d., cited in Taylor, 1955, p.79).

2. A multiple options approach

There is one more important aspect of Bismarck’s diplomacy that does not correspond with Clausewitz’s meaning, although both contemplate about the same concerns. The greatest difficulty, as Bismarck notes in the meeting with delegation from Jena, is that political objectives in foreign policy are prone to drastic changes. Thus, a statesman has to possess the ability to grasp changes in any situation and act to the greatest possible advantage with the minimal degree of harm to the state (Petersdorf et al., 1924-1935, vol. XIII, 1924-1935, p.468). Consequently, Bismarck invents a solution for tackling the greatest obstacle to successful policy-making - the constantly changing political circumstances. The key is to keep options open in every political situation (Pflanze, 1958, p.502). The multiple options approach to state politics is not covered in any of Clausewitz’s writings.

Nonetheless, Bismarck’s solution for a political uncertainty is based on the principles of rationality. For instance, in their conversation with Friedjung, Bismarck says, in order to attain a political goal, one has to try every possible path to it, where the most dangerous one is taken at last (Petersdorf et al., 1924-1935, vol. IX, p.50). Clausewitz’s policy-maker would do the same. Bismarck also writes that a policy-maker should never intentionally limit the range of moves on the chessboard, and even less so because of the fleeting emotions (Bismarck, 2/4 May 1860, Petersdorf et al., 1924-1935, vol. XIV, p.549). Bismarck suggests that the opponent will take an advantage of one’s “kindness without fear and without thanks” (Bismarck, 2 May 1857, cited in Persdorf et al., 1924-1935, vol. XIV, pp.464-468).

Moreover, Bismarck contrives to create the alternative ways to deliver policy and work with multiple potential courses of action (Holborn, 1960, p.95). For instance, one interesting way is to place the state in the middle between the states with hostile interests. Such a move enables Bismarck to sign off an alliance with either of the parties, and choose the most favourable course of action (Pflanze, 1958, p.503). This method corresponds with Clausewitz’s calculations for strategic policy-making. Just as Machiavelli, Clausewitz finds that policy-maker needs to use various political moves to eliminate the chance of aggression by an opponent. For instance, the middle-ground stance has enabled Bismarck to create an alternative way, ensuring the annexation of Denmark’s Schleswig-Holstein duchies (Steefel, 1932, p.95). Due to the discord caused by the diverse presence of interests, Bismarck has been able to play the states against one another much to Prussia’s advantage (Pflanze, 1958, pp.505-506).

Hence, Bismarck’s strategy is not envisaged in Clausewitz’s writings, it is still based on the same assumptions about the workings of the international system. According to Bismarck’s reasoning, the Clausewitzian model of state interests finds that a state’s interests depend on the position of other states, and that a state’s interest can produce multiple connections to various actors. Consequently, a state may be forced to pursue its interests in several directions at once to produce the best outcome.

3. Restraint and a lasting peace

By Gemälde von Anton von Werner, 1871,.Bismarck reads the Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles following Prussia's victory
 in the Franco-Prussian War. Prince F. William, Field Marshal von Moltke and Generakl A. von Rook are present with their staff.

Scholars like Liddell Hart (2014) regard Bismarck as a destabiliser of peace. Nevertheless, there are others, like Craig (1964, p.215), and Heuser (2002, pp.61-63) who reject this idea. Bismarck’s idea of policy seeks to promote Prussia’s interests without undermining the international system, that is why Craig (1964) and Heuser (2002) reject such a notion. For instance, Pflanze (1958, p.492) explains that Bismarck’s project of a unified Germany has not significantly upset the balance of power. This argument also highlights that Clausewitz’s ultimate objective- a peace- has been very important to Bismarck.

In 1877, Bismarck writes in a letter that the fight for hegemony would break the balance of power and create too many enemies for Germany (Herwig, 1998, p.71). For that reason, Germany should never pursue a position of hegemony in European relations. Consequently, just like Clausewitz (2014, pp.237-238) disapproving of France’s unconstrained conquest of power, Bismarck rejects the idea. Both would agree that such course of action will threaten Prussia’s interests and could make other powers, such as France, hostile to Prussia.

Furthermore, Bismarck spends a lot of time contemplating about the measures that could benefit Prussia and stabilise the balance of power. For example, in the memoirs, Bismarck suggests that alliances can be used to maintain the balance of power (Ritter and Stadelmann, 1924-1932, vol. XV, no.398). Bismarck speaks of it due to the conviction that revolutionary states need to be balanced by the united appearance of the monarchic elite (Petersdorf et al., 1924-35, vol. VIII, p.106). This counteraction may prevent the violent overthrow of monarchy in any of the concerned states (ibid.). The abolition of monarchic rule is not only seen as a threat to Prussia’s interests but also to the peace and stability of the state (Rothfels, 1934). A Clausewitzian policy-maker is likely to adopt such measures if they regard the dominance of monarchy in European political order beneficial to Prussia.

Also, Bismarck’s means of promoting peace are based on the two principles: the restraint and control. For instance, Taylor (1955, p.58) conducts a research on Bismarck’s political decision-making and concludes that Bismarck’s foreign policy is built on concessions. Bismarck makes these concessions to secure an agreement between the states and achieve a desired outcome but without subjecting the opponent to severe humiliation. A Clausewitzian ideal policy-maker behaves would be this way too; a statesman is meant to act in a way which maximises the chance of acquiring a favourable outcome, but without straining the inter-state relations needlessly.

Moreover, Bismarck argues that a control and restrain should always be exercised, even when the opponent is defeated and cannot fight back. For example, Bismarck has once said that a Napoleon I’s mistakes teach to practice a “wise moderation after the greatest successes” (Petersdorf et al., 1924-1935, vol. IX, pp.93-94). A similar lesson is derived by Clausewitz, who finds that Napoleon’s peace terms have frequently disregarded the feelings of the defeated, which is why the latter become so determined to retaliate later (Handel, 2000, pp.196-197).

Additionally, both Bismarck and Clausewitz affirm that a continuous “give and take of political goals and concessions” bargaining convinces the parties of the idea that prolongation of war brings them too many disadvantages, which the victory cannot compensate for (Fisher, 2007, pp.43-44). For instance, in a war against Austria, Bismarck implements political measures to ensure that Austria does not feel antagonised and may agree to become an ally in the next war (Taylor, 1955, p.86). The main concession on Bismarck’s part, which becomes a bargain for the future cooperation, is the agreement on sparing the Austria from annexation (Bismarck, n.d., cited in Taylor, 1955, p.88).

To summarise, Bismarck’s conduct of Realpolitik is intensely Clausewitzian in nature. The Bismarck’s theory demonstrates a cautious and committed statesman who calculates the range of potential opportunities for advancing Prussia’s interests. The concepts of rationalism, a balance of power, an alliance, and a limitation are built into the framework of state interests, and are used to make cautious inferences about policy-making; the careful calculation helps Prussia attain a political goal with minimal exposure to negative outcomes and brings the lowest costs, just as Clausewitz has envisaged. Although the multiple options approach is unaccounted by Clausewitz’s framework, it is uses the same set of values and considerations.